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Abstract : One of the unique banking in Indonesia is that there are regional development 
banks (RDB), which is a government-owned bank districts. Regional development banks 
categorized as focused bank, ie the bank with regional focus. The objective of this research 
is determinants of capital structure in region development bank (Bank Pembangunan 
Daerah). The external variables of the economy of a country in Indonesia are regional 
autonomy, bank policy of government and economic crisis.  The internal factor or 
characteristics of an individual bank are loans, size and profitability. The population 
consists of 26 community development banks. The study 14 regional development banks 
because of difficulty in getting the data. The period under study is from 1995 to 2010. In 
this study using panel data and analysis using pooled ordinary least square (OLS) and 
random effect. The results showed the regional autonomy negative influence on leverage 
because obtain additional funds from the local government. Dummy equity (policy 
government) positive influence on leverage the showed that regional development banks of 
equity have more than 100 billion would increase the amount of debt and the crisis negative 
influence on leverage because RDB reduces the amount of debt to avoiding from 
bankruptcy. Internal variables showed loans negative influence on leverage, assets positive 
influence on leverage, while profitability has not influence different from previous studies. 
 
Keywords: Leverage, regional development banks, regional autonomy, equity 
 
 
1. Research Background 
 
 
These two types of banks can be found in most countries in the world. There are private 
owned banks and government owned banks, but the uniqueness of Indonesian banking 
system is that there is another government owned banks category, which is called the 
community development banks. Community development banks in Indonesia exist in every 
district. They are monetary organizations operated on a local basis. In terms of coverage, 
their coverage is much smaller than the private and the publicly owned banks. RDB 
categorized as focused bank, ie the bank with regional focus. RDB thus able to create a 
healthy banking structure in the country and able to meet the needs of the community and 
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to promote the ongoing economic development of Indonesia. What can be the Determinants 
of Capital Structure of regional development banks in Indonesia?. These are the questions 
that the study wishes to answer. 
 
Determining an optimal capital structure is very hot issue in the literature of finance 
(Amjad et al., 2012). Among the issue in the district are the first regional autonomy laws 
that govern the financial district balance will lead to a rise in the influence of local 
government funds placed in RDB. Second, this study also supports the Indonesian 
Financial Sector Master plan (Indonesian bank architecture), where in 2011, all Indonesian 
bank ownership must have a minimum capital of IDR 100 billion. Bank Indonesia 
introduced regulations to allow banks face crucial moments such as the current financial 
crisis. Third, Indonesia's financial and political crisis that occurred in 1997 until 1999. 
These crises resulted in decreased performance of most banks. Banks are also experiencing 
problems with financial difficulties and bankruptcy threats. 
 
In previous literature, a lot of work is done on determining the factors which influence 
the capital structure of non-financial sectors. A number of factors were studied in this regard 
which would have influence on the capital structure of any organization. These factors may 
include profitability, size, assets’ tangibility, growth opportunities, debt tax shield, earning 
volatility, liquidity, age and non-debt tax shield. But a little work is done on determining the 
capital structure of financial sectors, especially for banking sectors in Indonesia. The main 
purpose of this study is to fill this gap by determining which factors have significant influence 
on capital structure decision of banking sector in Indonesia especially regional development 
banks. Moreover this study is aimed at determining the influence of these determinants without 
the application of capital regulatory requirements. 
 
The objective of this research is determinants of capital structure in region 
development banks context are examined with reference to capital structure theories. 
Although the determination of factors that affect the capital structure will typically be an 
interesting debate (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Haris and Raviv, 1991). This research is to 
test the influence of different explanatory variables of capital structure internal and external 
factors. The external variables of the economy of a country in Indonesia are regional 
autonomy, economic crisis and bank policy of government. The internal factor or 
characteristics of an individual bank are profitability, loans and size.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Based on MM theory was developed three theories. There are the trade-off theory (Bradley 
et al., 1984). Second pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and third, agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The pecking-order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984) suggests that capital structure choice is driven by the magnitude of 
information asymmetry present between the firm insiders and the outside investors. The 
more severe the information asymmetry, the more risk the outside investors are facing and 
hence the more discount they demand on the price of issued securities. Consequently, firms 
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will prefer financing through internal funds and if they do need to raise outside capital, they 
will firstly issue risk-free debt then followed by low-risk debt. Equity is only issued as a 
last resort. 
 
As stated in Myers (1984), the trade-off theory assumes that firms set an optimal 
debt ratio and they move gradually towards it. The theory proposes that the optimal debt 
ratio is set by balancing the tradeoff between the benefit and cost of debt. The benefit of 
debt arises from the tax deductibility of interest payments on debt and the cost of debt 
comes in the form of higher probability of bankruptcy and the loss suffered. 
 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), predicts capital structure choice based 
on the existence of agency costs, i.e. costs due to conflicts of interest. According to there 
are essentially two sources of conflicts. Conflicts between shareholders and managers arise 
since managers have an incentive to consume on perquisites while putting less effort on 
maximizing profit for the firm. This is because managers bear the entire costs of pursuing 
profit maximization while they do not receive the entire gain. By increasing the level of 
debt, this agency cost of managerial discretion can be mitigated in the event of bankruptcy. 
 
A. External variables 
1. Regional autonomy 
 
The determinants of firm capital structure decisions are typically examined in terms of 
firm-level characteristics, despite the fact that capital structure choices also likely to be 
determined by firm’s institutional environment (Alves and Ferreira, 2011), such as legal 
system and financial development, in Indonesia such regional autonomy. Regional 
autonomy is financial balance between central and local government has provided greater 
opportunities for areas to optimize the management of the potential in the region. Regional 
development banks as the holder of the financial district, which working as regional 
economic development and mobilize local economic development to improve and provide 
financing development in the region, to raise funds and to implement and save the cash area 
in addition to running the activities of the banking business.  
 
  The capital of deposits in particular the government, which placed a burden on the 
regional development banks as well as revenue. A burden because the bank is obliged to 
pay the interest placed in current accounts local government. Third party funds into income 
for regional development bank, when placed in the form of interbank assets or loans. If the 
difference between the expenses and the income generated is greater than the income, the 
benefits to be derived, and vice versa. Therefore, this study will look at the influence of 
regional autonomy on bank capital structure.  
 
 
2. Equity 
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Financial economists have recently placed more emphasis on the role of a legal system in 
the domain of financial decisions (Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996, 1998; La Porta 
et al., 1997, 1998). Recently, a variety of papers have examined the adoption of different 
legal systems and their influence on corporate finance. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) find that 
the legal environment plays a decisive role in the development of capital markets, because 
it influences accounting standards, shareholders’ rights, and creditors’ rights. They indicate 
that Common law countries benefit from having both good accounting standards and strong 
investor protection. De Jong et al. (2008) on the other hand, evaluated the role of firm and 
country specific determinants of capital structure in 42 countries. That the influence of 
specific determinants was not equal around the word because they depended on country 
specific factors.  
 
 In Indonesia had the Banking Master Plan Indonesia (Indonesia bank architecture), 
where in the year 2011, all acquisitions of banks in Indonesia must have a minimum equity 
of IDR 100 billion. Bank Indonesia introduced rules to allow banks face crucial moments 
like the current financial crisis. Therefore, this study will look at the effect of minimum 
capital requirements on bank capital structure. This study will test the appropriateness of 
this decision. If smaller banks are less likely to withstand severe economic downturn, then 
the coefficient of equity, which will be proxy by Dummy equity should be influence on 
leverage. However, it could also be argued that smaller banks will be more responsible in 
their lending activities since they know that imprudent lending decision would more likely 
to lead to bankruptcy as compared to larger banks. Banks can increase the amount of bank 
equity can increase the amount of debt. Therefore, this study will look at the influence of 
equity on bank capital structure.  
 
3. Economic Crisis 
 
Indonesian banking crisis began when the "net open position" increases, the value of capital 
ratio becomes negative and bad debt ratio to 50%. It is then followed by negative bank 
earnings as a result of the sharp rise in interest rates since the middle of the second half of 
1997. The financial crisis has led to the banking system has experienced financial 
difficulties and banking structure changed very significantly. This is due to the various 
weaknesses in banking and is exacerbated by the financial crisis, liquidity crisis and 
bankrupt crises experienced by the conglomerate in Indonesia. This resulted in many banks 
experiencing financial difficulties and the banking sector is a threat of bankruptcy. 
Therefore, this study will look at the effect of economic crisis on bank capital structure. 
The results study Fosberg (2012) showed that negative influence on Leverage. Therefore, 
this study will look at the influence of crisis on bank capital structure.  
 
B. Internal Variables 
 
1. Profitability 
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The trade-off hypothesis pleads for the low level of debt capital of risky firms (Myers, 
1984). The higher profitability of firms implies higher debt capacity and less risky to the 
debt holders. So, as per this theory, capital structure and profitability are positively 
associated. But pecking order theory suggests that this relation is negative. Since, as stated 
earlier, firm prefers internal financing and follows the sticky dividend policy. If the internal 
funds are not enough to finance financial requirements of the firm, it prefers debt financing 
to equity financing (Myers, 1984). Thus, the higher profitability of the enterprise implies 
the internal financing of investment and less reliance on debt financing. Most of the 
empirical studies support the pecking order theory. The studies of Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Friend and Lang (1988),  Fama and French (1998), Gleason at al. (2000), 
Hovakimian et al. (2001), Deesomsel et al. (2004), Cheng and Shiu (2007), Shah and Khan 
(2007), Gill et al. (2009), Céspedes et al. (2010) Gropp and Heider (2010), Khrawish and 
Khraiwesh (2010), Ellili and Farouk (2011), Afza and Hussain (2011), Alves and Ferreira 
(2011),  Siringoringo (2012), Sanistyaningrum and Gandakusuma (2012), Amjad et al. 
(2012) and Sharif et al. (2012) are result a negative influence profitability on leverage. 
While, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Aggarwal (1994) and Burgman (1996) are result a 
positive influence profitability on leverage. 
 
 
2. Loans 
 
Loans are part of the current assets, current assets of the banking sector is more important 
than fived bank assets because they can manage the funds rapidly. The banks prefer to have 
current assets greater than total assets. Many researchers used liquidity as an independent 
variable to measure its influence on leverage of the firm. Basically liquidity is the ability of 
any firm to meet its short term obligation when they become due. Ozkan (2001) reported 
that higher liquidity ratio implies that a firm has more power to pay its debt as they become 
due, hence, the firm can structure its financing pattern by taking more debt rather than 
issuing equity. This research shows that liquidity has direct relationship with leverage ratio. 
Yu (2000) also observed that banks with more liquidity have positive influence on leverage. 
On the other hand, Tong and Green (2005) observed an inverse relationship of liquidity 
with leverage. Childs et al. (2005) concluded that firms avoid interest rate and liquidity risk 
and have negative relation of long term debt ratio with liquidity. Similarly Guney et al. 
(2011), Mishra and Tannous (2010), Amjad et al. (2012) and Sharif et al. (2012) are result a 
negative influence liquidity on leverage.  
 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), Tong and Green (2005), Viviani (2008), Afza & Hussain, 
(2011), Guney et al. (2011), Mishra and Tannous (2010) and Sharif et al. (2012). While Yu 
(2000). Ozkan (2001) and Fama and French (2002) are result a positive influence liquidity 
on leverage. 
 
3. Size  
Leverage is expected to be positively influenced by size. The most plausible reason 
to explain such relationship is bankruptcy costs (Warner, 1977; Marsh, 1982; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). That is: first, large firms have, on average, lower bankruptcy costs – this 
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type of costs are in, general, more fixed – than small firms; second, large firms have in 
principle more diversified portfolios, with less probability of bankruptcy; third, financial 
institutions, because they have less information about a small firm, need to allocate more 
resources concerning the firm’s monitoring, and penalize it by asking for higher interest 
rates. Although the vast majority of research shows a positive relationship between size and 
leverage, such as Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Shenoy and Koch (1996), there is also 
some research that reveals the opposite results, namely those obtained by Titman and 
Wessels (1988). The bankruptcy cost theory explains the positive relation between the 
capital structure and size of a firm. The large firms are more diversified, have easy access 
to the capital market, receive higher credit ratings for debt issues, and pay lower interest 
rate on debt capital. Further, larger firms are less prone to bankruptcy (Titman and Wessels 
1988) and this implies the less probability of bankruptcy and lower bankruptcy costs. The 
bankruptcy cost theory suggests the lower bankruptcy costs, the higher debt level. 
 
Wald (1999), Fama and French (2002), Baral (2004), Deesomsak at al. (2004), 
Istaitieh and Rodríguez-Fernández (2006), Cheng and Shiu (2007), De Jong at al. (2008), 
Serrasqueiro and Rogão (2009), Lin et al. (2009), Céspedes et al. (2010), Gropp and Heider 
(2010), Khrawish and Khraiwesh (2010), Ellili dan Farouk (2011), Siringoringo (2012), 
Sanistyaningrum dan Gandakusuma (2012), Guney et al. (2011), Amjad et al. (2012) and 
Sharif et al. (2012) are finding a positive influence size on leverage. While, Shah and Khan 
(2007) and Mishra and Tannous (2010) are results a negative influence size on leverage.  
 
 
3. Research Methods 
 
 
The population consists of 26 community development banks. The study 14 regional 
development banks because of difficulty in getting the data. The period under study is from 
1995 to 2010. The data are taken from banks’ annual reports. In this study using panel data 
and analysis using pooled ordinary least square (OLS) and random effect. while fixed effect 
is not used in the analysis because the number of banks has not changed to any bank during 
the study period and there were three dummy variables. To test capital structure of 
community development banks, the following model is estimated: 
 
LEVit = 0 + 1*DRAit + 2*DEQUITYit + 3*DCRISISit + ZT + eit  
 
where 
LEVit  : Leverage that total debt to total assets of bank i in period t,  
DRAit   :  A dummy regional autonomy that takes on a value of one if t is from 2000 to 
2010, zero otherwise, 
DEQUITYit : A dummy equity variable that takes on a value of one if bank i has equity in 
excess of IDR 100 million in period t, zero otherwise. 
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DCRISISit : A dummy crisis variable that takes on a value of one if t is from 1997 to 1999, 
zero otherwise, 
Z : A matrix of control variables, which included net income to total assets (ROA), loans to 
assets (LOANS) and natural logarithm of total assets (ASSETS). 
eit : error term of bank i in period t.  
 
 
4. Result and Discussion 
 
 
Table 1 provides information on the degree of correlation between the explanatory 
variables used in the multivariate regression analysis. The matrix shows that in general the 
correlation between the variable that are used in the analysis is not strong suggesting that 
multicollinearity problem are either not severe or non-existent. Kennedy (2008) and 
Gujarati (2009) points out that multicollinearity is a problem when the correlation is above 
0.8, which is not the case here. To ensure that there is no problem of multicollinearity, 
variance inflation factor (VIF) are estimated and since the results show that the VIF are 
below 10.  
 
Table 1: Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
LEV DRA DEQUITY DCRISIS ROA LOANS ASSETS 
LEV 1.000 
 
      
DRA 0.163 1.000 
 
     
DEQUITY 0.124 0.800 1.000 
 
    
DCRISIS -0.248 -0.712 -0.570 1.000 
 
   
ROA -0.085 -0.139 -0.106 0.204 1.000 
 
  
LOANS -0.819 -0.135 -0.039 0.164 0.055 1.000 
 
 
ASSETS 0.096 0.484 0.527 -0.349 -0.074 -0.007 1.000 
 
LEV is total debt to total assets; DRA is A dummy regional autonomy that takes on a value of one from 2000 
to 2010, zero otherwise; DEQUITY is A dummy equity variable that takes on a value of one bank has equity 
in excess of IDR 100 million, zero otherwise; DCRISIS is A dummy crisis variable that takes on a value of 
one if from 1997 to 1999, zero otherwise; ROA is net income to total assets; LOANS is loans to total assets 
and ASSETS is natural logarithm of total assets 
 
Table 2 presents the pooled regression results without adjusting standard errors and 
with robust standard errors for heteroscedasticity. When we test for heteroscedasticity using 
Breusch-Pagan test, we find that we can reject the null hypothesis of equal variances. Thus, 
a better estimation model should account for heteroscedasticity Table 2 reports the results 
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based on adjusted standard errors using heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard error. We find 
that all coefficients are significant for LEV except ROA variable. The result regression with 
random effects show that DCRISIS and LOANS are significant on LEV (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Regression without adjusting and with robust standard errors 
   Dependent variable:  LEV 
 
Variable OLS without standard errors OLS with robust standard errors                  
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
 
Constan 
 
1.0144 
 
0.000*** 
 
1.0144 
 
0.000*** 
DRA -.0537 0.017** -.0537 0.003*** 
DEQUITY .0327 0.079* .0327 0.006*** 
DCRISIS -.0539 0.006*** -.0539 0.016** 
ROA -.0098 0.633 -.0098 0.742 
LOANS -.2820 0.000*** -.2820 0.000*** 
ASSETS .0033 0.165 .0033 0.099* 
     
R-squared 0.6947  0.6947  
Adjusted R-squared 0.6863    
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0002  
Number observation 224  224  
LEV is total debt to total assets; DRA is A dummy regional autonomy that takes on a value of one from 2000 
to 2010, zero otherwise; DEQUITY is A dummy equity variable that takes on a value of one bank has equity 
in excess of IDR 100 million, zero otherwise; DCRISIS is A dummy crisis variable that takes on a value of 
one if from 1997 to 1999, zero otherwise; ROA is net income to total assets; LOANS is loans to total assets 
and ASSETS is natural logarithm of total assets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively, p-value in parentheses 
 
 
 
Table 3: Regression with random effects 
               Dependent variable:  LEV 
 
Variable Coef. p-value 
 
Constan 
 
1.0099    
 
0.000***      
DRA   -.0341    0.108     
DEQUITY .0082     0.653     
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DCRISIS -.0525    0.003***     
ROA -.0189    0.324     
LOANS -.2823    0.000***     
ASSETS .0037    0.106     
   
R-squared 0.6919  
Prob > chi2 0.0000  
Number observation 224  
LEV is total debt to total assets; DRA is A dummy regional autonomy that takes on a value of one from 2000 
to 2010, zero otherwise; DEQUITY is A dummy equity variable that takes on a value of one bank has equity 
in excess of IDR 100 million, zero otherwise; DCRISIS is A dummy crisis variable that takes on a value of 
one if from 1997 to 1999, zero otherwise; ROA is net income to total assets; LOANS is loans to total assets 
and ASSETS is natural logarithm of total assets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively, p-value in parentheses 
 
 
DRA (regional autonomy) has a negative influence on LEV. This suggests that 
regional autonomy with effect from the year 2000, region development banks can lower the 
amount of debt because it have received additional funding from the local government such 
kept in current accounts deposited  or serve as additional equity on RDB. The funds from 
the local government can reduce RDB to increased hunting effort deposit so that the 
composition of debt can be reduced. In addition, funding of local governments can be used 
to be placed in Bank Indonesia Certificates which at the beginning of the second quarter of 
2007, total deposits of all positions in the region development bank placed around IDR 96 
trillion or 24, 35% of all total banks.   
 
 
DEQUITY has a positive influence on LEV. This suggests that the RDB has equity 
greater than IDR 100 billion more to add to the amount of debt. This condition is to 
maintain the bank's financial risk in the amount of the debt to equity ratio. In these 
circumstances the local government will assist RDB when adding equity if deposit funding 
has increased. RDB will be able to increase the amount of debt to be distributed on loan. 
 
DCRISIS has a negative influence on LEV. This indicates that financial crisis in 
Indonesia, RDB reduces the amount of debt due to deduct interest payments on debt are 
high and keep the bank from bankruptcy. This finding is consistent with Fosberg (2012) 
who find a negative relationship of crisis on leverage. 
 
The relationship between ROA and LEV, while a negative expected, is not 
statistically significant. This may be due to the advantage of RDB handed over to local 
government funding sources that are not used as an internal bank to reduce the amount of 
bank debt. The result is contrast with most previous such as Gropp and Heider (2010), 
Khrawish and Khraiwesh (2010), Ellili and Farouk (2011), Afza and Hussain (2011), Alves 
and Ferreira (2011), Siringoringo (2012), Sanistyaningrum and Gandakusuma (2012) and 
Sharif et al. (2012) there are a negative influence of ROA on leverage. 
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The result showed that LOANS negative influence on LEV. This suggests that the 
level of loans has a significant influence on the ability of banks to provide funds. Loans is 
high as seen from the level of non-performing loans from a bank, it can reduce the level of 
public confidence, which led to banks having difficulty in raising funds from third parties, 
thus reducing the sources of debt financing. The result related to Guney et al. (2011), 
Mishra and Tannous (2010) and Sharif et al. (2012) which show that a negative influence of 
liquidity on leverage.  
 
The finding showed that ASSETS positive influence on LEV. These results are 
consistent with the trade-off theory in which the ASSETS of large banks tend to use more 
debt in comparison small bank. Large size RDB indicates that the bank has a large asset 
such as this tend to use bank debt in the capital structure have greater access easier to 
obtain bank loans because these are considered to have a smaller risk of bankruptcy than 
small banks. The result is consistent with previous research study conducted by Wald 
(1999), Fama and French (2002), Baral (2004), Deesomsak at al. (2004), Istaitieh and 
Rodríguez-Fernández (2006), Cheng and Shiu (2007), De Jong at al. (2008), Serrasqueiro 
and Rogão (2009), Lin et al. (2009), Céspedes et al. (2010), Gropp and Heider (2010), 
Khrawish and Khraiwesh (2010), Ellili and Farouk (2011), Siringoringo (2012), 
Sanistyaningrum and Gandakusuma (2012), Guney et al. (2011), Sharif et al. (2012) 
showed ASSETS  positive influence on leverage. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
The result of study assist in examining the determinants of capital structure of regional 
development banks in Indonesia. The period under study is from 1995 to 2010. Our study 
uncovers interesting results. We find that regional autonomy has a negative influence on 
leverage. This showed that region development banks can lower the amount of debt 
because it have received additional funding from the local government such kept in current 
accounts deposited  or serve as additional equity on RDB. Dummy equity has a positive 
influence on leverage. This showed that the local government will assist RDB when adding 
equity if deposit funding has increased. RDB will be able to increase the amount of debt to 
be distributed on loan. Economic crisis has a negative influence on leverage. This showed 
that RDB reduces the amount of debt due to deduct interest payments on debt are high and 
keep the bank from bankruptcy. In addition our result showed that LOANS negative and 
ASSETS positive influence on leverage. While the ROA a negative expected, is not 
statistically significant. In future research to obtain better results expected in order to 
addition the variable and comparing with private and government banks. 
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